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FAIR TRIAL AND PREJUDICIAL
PUBLICITY: A NEED FOR
REFORM
By J. TH o AS McCA I*
Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the
meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.1
Prologue: A Case in Point
THE murder suspect was arrested at 1:45 Friday afternoon and
taken directly to police headquarters. He was questioned intermit-
tently for about twelve hours and continued to deny categorically his
guilt. Consistent with its policy of allowing news representatives in
the working quarters of the police building, the police made every
effort to keep the press informed as to the progress of the investiga-
tion. As a result, the press publicized virtually all information about
the case as soon as it was uncovered by the police.
Impromptu and clamorous press conferences were held in the
corridor at headquarters. The Chief of Police appeared in interviews
on television and radio, expressed his opinion, and gave detailed in-
formation on the progress of the case.
Could this defendant be given a fair trial by an impartial jury?
Would it be possible to find twelve unprejudiced persons after such
a barrage of prejudicial publicity? A court was never faced with
these questions. The accused was shot and killed less than forty-
eight hours later by an aroused citizen.
The facts of this case are now history. The setting: Dallas, Texas,
November, 1963. The accused: Lee Harvey Oswald.
For two days Lee Harvey Oswald received more public attention
than any other prisoner in history. The sudden murder of a young
and popular president shocked the nation. But as emotions cooled,
the legal dilemma presented by the assassination became acutely
apparent. It is now the general consensus that it would have been
almost impossible for Oswald to receive a fair trial anywhere in the
* B.S., 1960, University of Detroit; LL.B., 1963, University of Michigan. Member,
California Bar.
I Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
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United States.2 Oswald attracted no one's sympathy. Yet it is for
this reason that it was important that he be accorded as fair treat-
ment as anyone else. As the late Justice Frankfurter incisively re-
marked: ".... not the least significant test of the quality of a civiliza-
tion is its treatment of those charged with crime, particularly with
offenses which arouse the passions of a community."
The rule of trial by jury broke down in Oswald's case. The evi-
dence was widely disseminated among the public. The public heard
the evidence and judged Oswald guilty. However, the same treat-
ment, in lesser degrees of prejudice, is accorded all newsworthy de-
fendants. The Oswald case is but a spectacular example. The courts
are daily presented with the problem of selecting a jury from among
a public which has already heard the case presented in the press.
The Warren Commission pointed out the problem:
The disclosure of evidence encouraged the public, from which a jury
would ultimately be impaneled, to prejudge the very questions that
would be raised at trial.4
Oswald's case was not unique, but was rather symptomatic of the
general policies of American police officials and news media. The
notoriety of the case renewed interest in the ancient conflict be-
tween a free press and a fair trial.5
The Requirement of an Impartial Jury
... the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury .... 6
It is the state of mind of the members of a jury which is primarily
critical in determining what kinds of publicity should be classified
as "prejudicial."7 To define terms, it should be said that a juror who
2 THE OFFIcIAL WARREN Coinun irrzE REPORT ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN F. KENEy, 239 (1964) [hereinafter bited as WAmmN REPOnRT; Time, Nov. 27,
1964, p. 52.
8 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).
4 WmujN REPORT 238.
5 Se generally Perry, The Courts, the Press and the Public, 30 MIcn. L. REv. 228,
230 (1931); 66 U.S.L. REv. 374 (1932); 11 Pane. L.J. 277 (1932); a hypothetical
case of press coverage is set forth which bears a remarkable resemblance to the facts
of the Oswald case. Perry remarked that "trial by newspaper ... [has been] an object
of continual protest and warning for over a century. It is a disease that does not cure
itself." 30 Mic-. L. RFv. at 231.
6 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
7 Judges can also be prejudiced by publicity on a case. In Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 396 (1947), Jackson, J., dissenting, emphasized, "but even worse is that this
Court appears to sponsor the myth that judges are not as other men are, and that
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has been exposed to "prejudicial" publicity cannot be truly "impartial"
in the constitutional sense of the word.
"Prejudice" itself is a descriptive term; it implies a "pre-judging"
-a judgment or opinion arrived at before evidence has been pre-
sented subject to the rules of admissibility.8 When the jury is not
impartial, then it is the accused on trial who is consequently "preju-
diced" in the sense that he has been "pre-judged" before he ever
enters the courtroom.
The primary source of the basic necessity for an impartial jury
is the United States Constitution, which merely restated the basic
common law jury requirements which had evolved out of the mists
of English jurisprudence. In sparsely populated eleventh-century
England, jurors were neighbors who were presumed to be witnesses
to the facts. However, as the population increased, the jury knew
little or nothing of the facts in dispute. It was then that witnesses
who knew the facts were called in to testify. The very thing that
previously qualified a man for jury service (knowledge of the facts)
now served to disqualify, him.9 By the end of the fifteenth century
the jury had shed its old character and was assumed to be unknowing
and indifferent to the facts presented by the witnesses.'0
'In addition to the sixth amendment," the guarantee of an im-
partial jury is embodied mi the constitutions of 39 states and can be
implied from the guarantee of trial by jury in the other 11 states.12
The United States Supreme Court now has held that the fourteenth
amendment's requirement of due process requires an impartial jury:
"In essence the right to jury trial guarantees the criminally accused
a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent" jurors. The failure to
therefore newspaper attacks on them are negligible because they do not penetrate the
judicial armor." Rex v. Davies [19451 1 K.B. 435, 445; but in general, such prejudice
is more in the nature of political pressure (judges are elected in about three-fourths of
the states).
8 "Prejudice: (n.) an opinion or leaning adverse to anything without just grounds
or before sufficient knowledge" WEBsTER, Nnw INTErNATONAL DcroNAnY (2d ed.
1934).
9 White, Origin and Development of Trial by jury, 29 TENN. L. REy. 8 (1961).
10 FA~xq, CoUnTs ON Tar.A, 109 (1949). At a time when men were tried on the
continent in private by inquisition, the lowliest English defendant might challenge
his jury for prejudice. BowEN, TAE LIoN An THE THRONE 43 (1957); See Leavitt,
The Jury at Work, 13 HAsvmoas L.J. 415 (1962).
"1 The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the sixth amendment includes all essen-
tial elements of the jury as were recognized in the United States and England when
the Constitution was adopted. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
12 COLSee umrA UNiasrry LGsLAv xv DRA&=NG BESEAXCH FuND, INDEX DIGEST
OF STATE CONSTrUPIONS, 579 (1959).
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accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards
of due process."1
Judicial Safeguards in Pending Cases
The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury; all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
fiction.' 4
Procedurally, the problems facing a trial judge can be broken
down into two broad categories: (1) publicity which occurs prior
to empaneling of the jury, and (2) publicity appearing during the
trial itself.
The specter of pre-trial publicity first appears in the courtroom
on voir dire examination of the veniremen or jury panel. The judge
or defense counsel asks the prospective juror whether he has read
of the case in the papers or heard of it on radio or television. The
answer is yes.15 Logically, this is the time for the judge to allow or
refuse a challenge for cause, basing his decision on the nature of
the publicity to which the panel member has been exposed. How-
ever, the traditionally accepted approach is to pose these two loaded
questions to the prospective juror: (1) Have you formed an opinion
as to the defendant's guilt? and (2) Will you place your opinion
aside and swear to do your duty to render a fair and impartial ver-
dict based on the evidence to be presented?16 If the juror is at all
'3 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); quoted in Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466 (1965). The question discussed is the impartiality of the trial or petit jury.
Irvin v. Dowd, supra. As for a grand jury, the Supreme Court in Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541 (1962), said that it would not "remotely intimate any view" on the
argument that an unprejudiced grand jury is required by the due process clause. Id. at
546. A re-screening of the grand jury every time the investigation turns on a new
suspect seems to be an unnecessary burden on the grand jury system. Comment, 111
U. PA. L. BEv. 1000, 1003 (1963); see United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283
(N.D. Cal. 1952).
14 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
15 That is, the answer is yes if the panel member is honest about it or if he regards
it as important enough to mention. "A half-forgotten headline may seem to a juryman
too trivial to mention, yet it may have planted the seed that changes a vote in the jury
room." Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50 A.B.A.J.
1125, 1126 (1964); If the prospective juror has been aroused enough by advance
publicity, he may say anything to get a chance to cast a vote for conviction.
16 See, e.g., Geagon v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
903 (1962); People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 2d 803, 350 P.2d 103 (1960); People v.
Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 256 P.2d 911 (1953); People v. Schneider, 309 Mich. 158,
14 N.W.2d 819 (1944); State v. Johnson, 362 Mo. 833, 245 S.W.2d 43 (1951); People
v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 478, 180 N.E.2d 419, 225 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1962); Klinedinst v.
State, 159 Tex. 510, 265 S.W.2d 593 (1953); Hampton v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 531,
58 S.E.2d 288 (1950).
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honest, he will answer the first question in the affirmative, for the
vast majority of publicity is of a nature to prompt an opinion on
the reader's part-usually an opinion of guilt.17 The second question
is not really a question at all-it is in effect, a direction to the juror
to disregard what he has read or seen. There is tremendous pressure
on a panel member to answer such a question in the affirmative: "It
is obvious that prejudice may lurk in the unconscious, but even
where it is in the conscious the juror is told what his obligation is
and then asked whether he can perform his duty. Indeed, the ques-
tion might well have been asked whether the juror loves his country."'8
The juror answers that he will do his duty, and the challenge for
cause is denied. It is apparent that this approach does not avoid the
effects of prejudicial publicity-it merely ignores them. The problem
is side-stepped by assuming that a juror can wipe his mind clear as
one would wipe a slate clean.'9 Any amateur psychologist would
blanch at so naive an approach to the complicated workings of the
human mind. This procedural approach to the problem of prejudicial
publicity must be taken for what it is-nothing more than a legal
fiction. The juror is assumed to be impartial, when in fact everyone
knows he is not. As with most legal fictions, this one was imposed
by the pressures of practical judicial administration. In a community
where nearly everyone has knowledge of the case, disqualifying those
who are actually prejudiced would make it very difficult (and some-
times impossible) to impanel a jury. The problem is that this legal
fiction assumes tragic proportions when "life and liberty" are at stake.
This fiction was initially given full blessing by the United States
Supreme Court in the leading case of Holt v. United States.20 There,
a number of jurors read publicity of the case both prior to and during
the trial. A challenge for cause and a motion for new trial were both
denied by the trial judge, relying on the jurors' promise of impartial-
ity.2 Mr. Justice Holmes stated that this was a matter of the trial
17 Mr. Chief Justice Waite in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878)
points out that "the theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot
be impartial."
18 Note, The Two Forums of a Criminal Trial: The Courtroom and the Press, 14
SYtAcusE L. REv. 450, 466 (1963), reprinted 109 CoNG. REC. 11880 (1963).
19 "The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it un-
consciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the average man," Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961); see Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113
(1st Cir. 1952); People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954).
20218 U.S. 245 (1910).
21 A challenge for cause was denied for a prospective juror who said that "he had
taken the newspaper statements for facts ... [but] he thought he could try the case
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court's discretion and would not be overturned unless there was very
clearly an abuse of that discretion:
If the mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to raise a
presumption that they did exist, it will be hard to maintain jury trial
under the conditions of the present day.., we do not see in the facts
before us any conclusive ground for saying that [the trial judge's]
expressed belief that the trial was fair and that the prisoner has
nothing to complain of is wrong.22
Or, in other words, the trial court has virtually unlimited discretion
in ruling on the issue of prejudice. Following this case, almost every
jurisdiction in the country has adopted the fiction that prejudice is
eliminated if the juror says so. 23 As an additional weight on the de-
fendant, it is the settled rule that a prospective juror is presumed to
be impartial. The burden is on the defendant to show actual prejudice.
The courts have not suggested how this can be accomplished.2
It was not until Marshall v. United States, 25 that the Supreme
Court cast some doubt on the propriety of the Holt case. In Marshall
a federal judge refused to allow into evidence at trial defendant's
previous record. Soon thereafter, newspaper accounts appeared which
set forth the very facts which the judge had previously ruled inad-
missible. When questioned, seven of the jurors admitted reading this
material. Each was asked the question as, to prejudice and each said
that he would not let himself be influenced by the news articles. A
motion for mistrial was denied and defendant was convicted. The
Supreme Court reversed saying: "The prejudice to the defendant is
almost certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury
through news accounts as when it is d part of the prosecutions evi-
solely upon the evidence, fairly and impartially." Id. at 248. Affidavits were submitted
showing that jurors had read of the case in the newspapers during trial. Id. at 250-51.
221d. at 251.
28 See, e.g., cases cited note 13 supra; Some states have statutes which take the
matter out of the judge's discretion; e.g., CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1076, states that no person
can be disqualified as a juror-by reason of previously formed opinions if the juror
states that he can and will act impartially and fairly; this is also the rule where the
prospective juror is of the opinion that defendant is guilty and that he would require
evidence to overcome this opinion; e.g., People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 256
P.2d 911 (1953). It is difficult to reconcile this approach with the presumption that an
accused is innocent until proven guilty.24 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 157 (1878); attempts to introduce evidence as to community prejudice have been
thwarted, United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1952); Irvin v. State,
66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1954).
25 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
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dence .... It may indeed be greater for it is then not tempered by
protective measures."26
The Marshall case defined a'new and refreshingly honest approach
to the problem. It was the first time that the nature and quality of
the publicity in question was emphasized. When the publicity to
which the jurors have been exposed is so obviously "prejudicial,"
then their promises of impartiality must be disregarded. The mere
reading of prejudicial material was enough to cause the court to hold,
as a matter of law, that the jurors themselves had been prejudiced.
For the first time, a rule was established by which publicity could
be judged. Marshall held that publicity which reports inadmissible
evidence is inherently prejudicial. "Inadmissible evidence" as used
here means evidence, the admission of which at trial would be re-
versible error. Anyone who reads such material cannot be an impar-
tial juror, his promises to the contrary notwithstanding.'7
The next such case was Irvin v. Dowd,2" where the Court recited
the old Holt rule but went on to reverse the case. In Irvin, six murders
were committed within three months near Evansville, Indiana. The
crimes were extensively covered by news media in the locality and
"aroused great excitement and indignation" throughout the area.29
The Court paid lip service to the Holt rule: "It is sufficient if the juror
can lay. aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based
on the evidence presented in court." 0 But the Court then went on
to examine the quantity and quality of the publicity disseminated to
find that no juror could be believed when he said he could disregard
the kind of abusive and sensational publicity found in the case.s'
Rather than use the "inadmissible evidence" approach of the Marshall
case,22 the Court in Irvin looked at the publicity as a whole and its
effect on those in the jury panel. Of a jury panel of 430 persons, 268
were excused because they were convinced that Irvin was guilty.
26 Id. at 312.
27 However, the Court in Marshall was careful to leave a large loophole by caution-
ing that "each case must turn on its special facts." 360 U.S. at 312. Later cases have
used this to avoid the reasoning of Marshall; e.g., People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 478,
180 N.E.2d 419, 225 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1962), note 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 601.
28 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
29 Id. at 719.
80 Id. at 723.
81 See authorities cited note 19 supra.
82 As a matter of fact, the great bulk of publicity involved in Irvin would have
been inadmissible if presented at trial and, if admitted, would have produced reversible
error.
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Eight of those finally selected admitted that they felt defendant was
guilty but each stated that he could render an "impartial" verdict.
One of the last such cases to come before the Supreme Court was
Beck v. Washington,8 where David Beck, then president of the Team-
ster's Union, was convicted of embezzlement of union funds. The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the news coverage was "neither
intensive nor extensive" 4 and that "although most of the persons
thus selected for the trial jury had been exposed to some of the
publicity," each one indicated that "he would enter the trial with
an open mind disregarding anything he had read on the case."3 5
Thus, it seems that the Supreme Court never really meant to abandon
the old legal fiction approved in the Holt case at all. The publicity in-
volved in the Beck case was not distinguishable in kind from that
which appeared in the Marshall and Irvin cases.3 6 Later cases finding
the jury impartial in the fact of prejudicial news coverage rely heavily
on the dictum of Irvin and the decision in the Beck case.
The most recent Supreme Court decision in this area is Rideau
v. Louisiana,17 where two weeks prior to his arraignment for armed
robbery, kidnapping and murder in Lake Charles, Louisiana, the
defendant appeared in a film on television. The filmed "interview"
was conducted by the sheriff and consisted of interrogation by the
sheriff and a confession by Rideau. The film was eventually seen by
about 29,000 people in the immediate area. Three members of the
empaneled jury had seen the televised film. The trial judge denied
a motion for change of venue and Rideau was convicted and sentenced
to death. In a short opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, saying that "It was a denial of due
process of law to refuse the request for a change of venue . . .""
when so many people had seen and heard Rideau plead guilty to
murder on television and ". . . that due process of law in this case
required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people
who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised 'interview' ... ,
None of the Court's previous decisions in this area were cited in the
majority opinion. Justices Clark and Harlan dissented, citing Irvin
33369 U.S. 541 (1962).
84 Id. at 556-57.
85 Id. at 557.
86 In Beck, a Senate Committee released many prejudicial remarks to the press,
creating the impression among the general public that Beck had been found guilty of a
crime. State v. Beck, 56 Wash. 2d 474, 512, 349 P.2d 387, 408 (1960).
87 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
S8 Id. at 726.
89 Id. at 727.
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to the effect that the majority never showed any "substantial nexus
between the televised interview and petitioner's trial."40 Mr. Justice
Clark pointed out that he dissented not only because the majority
deviated from the principles of Irvin v. Dowd, but because the
majority opinion "applies no principles at all."41 This is substantially
the problem with fitting the Rideau case into any set of constitutional
rules, for the majority seems to rest its decision on a general feeling
that the treatment of Rideau was unfair and shocking, without con-
sidering any connection between the televised interview and the
state of mind of the jurors who found Rideau guilty. For this reason
the Rideau decision is anomalous and only serves to cloud the prob-
lem of determining what is and what is not prejudicial publicity.
Where the Supreme Court now stands on the issue is open to con-
jecture.
The logic of the Marshall case is the only honest approach to the
problem. If it is reversible error to expose a juror to inadmissible
matter in court, then it should be equally erroneous to seat as a
juror a person who has been txposed to this same matter outside of
court.
Since the overwhelming bulk of publicity about pending cases
involves such inadmissible matter, an application of the Marshall
reasoning as a constitutional rule would make it extremely difficult
to empanel a jury in a locality which has been saturated by news
of the case. One's first impression is that this puts a "premium upon
ignorance," since usually the most desirable jurors will be those
intelligent and well-informed persons who follow the news and con-
sequently would have to be disqualified.4 2 However, other procedural
remedies are available, namely motions for a continuance 3 or change
of venue.44 A hard-pressed defense counsel may be forced to waive
4OId. at 729.
41Ibid.
42 "If intelligent jurors are to be secured, then there must be some relaxation of
rules as to their competency. Most intelligent men and all educated men read news-
papers, and they would have to be more than human if they did not form some
opinion . .. To reject them for this reason is to put a premium upon ignorance."
Ballard v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 980, 159 S.E. 222, 229 (1931).
43 Delay may cool public outrage, but "the influence that lurks in an opinion once
formed" remains; see note 19 supra.
44 "But if freedoms of press are so abused as to make fair trial in the locality im-
possible, the judicial process must be protected by removing the trial to a forum beyond
its probable influence." Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 52 (1950); "But modem
news media are set up on a national scale. In a newsworthy case, participants who make
news cannot escape publicity merely by skipping across county lines." Goldfarb, Public
Information, Criminal Trials, and the Cause C6I6bre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810, 821 (1961).
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the right to jury trial. But in many courts even this will not be per-
mitted.45
The problems of publicity appearing during the trial can usually
be adequately handled by an alert defense counsel and a conscien-
tious trial judge. When it appears that the trial is going to receive
extensive press coverage, then special precautions should be taken.46
Of course, only total confinement of the jury will ensure insula-
tion of jurors from the press. When the jurors are allowed to disperse,
then the risk of a mistrial hangs on their fidelity to the judge's in-
struction not to read of the case. When publicity appears, the judge
should question each juror separately in his chambers.
Some cases have been reversed because the trial judge refused
to question jurors as to whether they had read accounts of the case. 7
In another case, the trial judge did ask the jury if they had read
the newspaper accounts in question and no less than nine jurors and
two alternates raised their hands in the affirmative.48 Such trials
are usually allowed to proceed after the jurors have been prompted
to state that they are not prejudice a.4  Trial judges and counsel
should be prepared to handle sensational trials with kid gloves
rather than try to gloss over the existence and effect of publicity
appearing during trial. 0
45 A criminal defendant has no right to waive a jury without the consent of the
prosecution and the trial judge. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).46 Kutner, Unfair Comment: A Warning to News Media, 17 U. M.mi L. BEv. 51,
54 (1962). Judges should not dismiss inflammatory publicity by equating a quiet court-
room atmosphere with a fair trial. This ignores what is going on in the jurors' minds.
Note, 14 SYR&cusE. L. R-v. 450, 461 (1963).
47E.g., United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962). Note, 12 Ah.
U.L. REv. 90. The trial judge felt that the integrity of the jury would be assailed if
he admitted the possibility that the jurors had not followed his instructions; see Coppedge
v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959), which reversed a conviction because
the inquiry of the jurors was not adequate; see also Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d
156 (8th Cir. 1960), re'd per curiam, 366 U.S. 716 (1961); United States v. Alker,
180 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1959); contra, 53 Am. Jun. Tnmx. § 895 (1945, Supp.
1962), stating that it is within the judge's discretion whether or not to poll the jury
as to whether they have read of the trial.
48 United States v. Carlucci, 288 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1961).
49 Ibid., where all of the eleven jurors qualified their answer to conform with the
one juror who said that he had only read the headlines and "scanned" the articles.
The conviction was affirmed. See generally, People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 461, 180
N.E.2d 419, 225 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1962); it has been correctly pointed out that no juror
will admit in front of his fellow-jurors that he would be influenced in his verdict by
having read a newspaper story, Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 508 (D.C.
Cir. 1959), especially where to do so would make him appear to be responsible for
the mistrial of a notorious defendant. Comment, 12 Am. U.L. 11Ev. 90 (1963).
50 "[C]autious judges and counsel will lay the groundwork for assuring fair trials
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The Nature of Publicity
... neither the press nor the public had a right to be contempora-
neously informed by the police or prosecuting authorities of the
details of the evidence being accumulated against Oswald."'
In the recent cases the Supreme Court has heard on prejudicial
publicity, the Court adopted the new approach of looking to the
nature of the publicity which the panel members or jurors had read.
If that publicity was obviously "prejudicial," then the statements of
the jurors as to impartiality must be disregarded. However, only the
Marshall case gave an indication as to a fixed standard by which
publicity could be judged. That is, "prejudicial publicity" is informa-
tion, the introduction of which at trial would produce reversible error.
It should make no difference whether the juror is exposed to prejudi-
cial matter in or out of the courtroom. The effect on the juror's mind
is the same. In fact, most jurors will be more deeply affected by in-
formation appearing in the familiar guise of the newspaper and tele-
vision set, than they are by the unfamiliar question and answer method
used in the courtroom. Publicity appearing in news media is simple
and direct; it appeals primarily to the emotions and is therefore
hard to detect or to ignore.
What kinds of publicity commonly appear in modem news media?
A goodly percentage can be lumped under one or both of these two
categories of information: (1) that which sets forth the past record,
usually a criminal record, of the accused,5 2 and (2) that which re-
ports the fact of a confession or the confession itself.58 There are many
other types remaining, e.g., independent "investigations" by the press;5 4
photographs of the defendant or the victim, 5 and evidence uncovered
by taking certain steps as a matter of course when prejudicial publicity is present...."
Kutner, supra note 46, at 54.
5 1 WREN REPonRT 240.52 Evidence of the accused's evil character is commonly inadmissible to establish
a probability of guilt. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); United
States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Alker, 180 F.
Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1959); see 1 WIGMOBE, EVIDENcE § 57 (3d ed. 1940); 1 WHAnToN,
CmmnAL EvmENcE § 330 (11th ed. 1935).
53 Confessions are reported as a matter of course. The press seldom bothers to see
if there are any questionable angles. Lofton, Justice and the Press, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J.
449, 461 (1961); see generally Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), criticizing
police dependence on confessions as a means of proving guilt; a person who has read
of a confession and is later called as a juror is understandably confused.
54 Lofton, supra note 53, at 465. The press often solicits the "testimony" of potential
witnesses; e.g., see Burton W. Abbott case, San Francisco Examiner, July 21, 1955, p. 2.
55 Lofton, supra note 53, at 467; photographs of the defendant may help or hinder
him (or her), depending on physical appearance and when the picture was taken.
See, e.g., Hxys, TnTAx By PEmjuicE 37 (1933).
October, 1965]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
at the scene of the crime which may later become inadmissible.56
This is all in addition to sensationally slanted opinions and comments
on the basic facts . 7 Most publicity is obtained directly from the
police or prosecutor and consequently is hardly of the type that
breaks favorably for the suspect.
It is seen that the great bulk of crime reporting conveys informa-
tion which would be inadmissible at the trial. Even if admissible
evidence is reported, it has been conveyed to the reader without
being subject to the extensive rules of evidence which the law has
evolved to protect the accused.
Chief Judge Desmond of the New York Court of Appeals criti-
cized the present procedural approach in these words: "I refuse to
concede ... that we must be satisfied by the incredible statements
of jurors that they can read such stuff and then wipe it off their
minds.""'
It is demeaning for the bench and bar to continue to give official
sanction to this fallacy. Persons who read obviously inadmissible or
sensational reports must be disqualified if "impartial" trials are to
be held. However, the present price of such honesty is the extreme
difficulty of finding truly impartial jurors. For this reason, serious
consideration must be given to controlling the nature and quantity
of publicity which is disseminated among the public.
Controlling the Source of Prejudicial Publicity
The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must be re-
versed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors
or potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally
protected in plying his trade.5 9
... we are hearing again the ancient ciy that the free press is the
enemy of fair trial.o
56 E.g., a number of erroneous details were released and publicized in the Oswald
case, WA REN REPoRT, 238-40.
57 E.g., in the Oswald case Captain Will Fritz (Chief of the Dallas Police Homicide
Bureau) said that the case against Oswald was "cinched" and "we're convinced beyond
any doubt that he killed the President:" N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1963, p. 1. Chief of
Police Curry reported that "we are sure of our case," WAmN REP ORT 239. District
Attorney Wade said, "I think that we have enough evidence to convict him now."
N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1963, p. 1. See Comment, Trial by Newspaper, 33 FoswHm L.
REv. 61 (1964).
58 People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 478, 487, 180 N.E.2d 419, 424, 225 N.Y.S.2d
22, 33 (1962) (dissenting opinion of Desmond, C.J.).59 Irvin v. Dowd, 336 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
6 0 Mr. Sam Ragan, President Associated Press Managing Editors Assn., Time,
Nov. 27, 1964, p. 52.
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The great bulk of published material prejudicial to prospective
jurors is released by the prosecution or the police. Therefore, it can
accurately be said that the source of prejudicial publicity is two-
fold: (1) news media itself-press, radio, and television, and (2)
the original source-prosecuting attorneys and the police.
Motivation of the Fourth Estate
Aside from merely being an exercise of the First Amendment's
right of free speech, press coverage of crime news produces a number
of concrete benefits to society. This coverage prevents the police
from relaxing their battles against crime and exposes to public
criticism questionable police tactics.6' In general, the press acts as
a watchdog for the people and opens police and court procedures
to the scrutiny of the citizens. By its very existence the press acts
as a restraint on abuse and corruption in law enforcement and judi-
cial administration. 2 But, in the main, these beneficial aspects of the
press do not depend for their effectiveness on contemporaneous com-
mentary on only the most notorious cases. As the Warren Report
commented, the public does not have a right to be kept abreast of
all the evidence as it is accumulated. 63 The morbid curiosity of the
public should not be satisfied at the expense of an accused's right
to trial by an impartial jury.64
It seems safe to assume that the press, in taking a hostile view of
all criminal suspects, either accentuates an already existing outlook
or at least urges the public in that direction. In crime news a basic
emotional need is satisfied by providing a vicarious outlet for sup-
pressed antagonism. 65 News media are run on a severely competitive
basis. The "press" does not exist solely for the public good, but is
a business which depends for its existence on profits. It was learned
early that sensational crime stories sell newspapers. The fact is that
adultery, butchery, insanity and passion are best sellers. The rea-
61 E.g., in the Wylie murder case in New York, "enterprising reporters also played
a vital part in uncovering evidence that contradicted the original police version of the
case." N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1965, p. 26, col. 2 (editorial on role of press in criminal
cases); see N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1965, p. 1, col. 4-5.
62 E.g., the controversy and debate created by publicity in Chicago, where Judge
George Leighton set free the attackers of two policemen. Time, March 19, 1965, p. 56.
6a WARnEN REPoRT 240.
64
"The courtroom, not the newspaper or television screen, is the appropriate forum
in our system for the trial of a man accused of a crime." Ibid.
65 Lofton, supra note 53, at 472. "[Tlhe public can be expected to . . . remain
completely at the mercy of their emotions in dealing with the more 'extreme' forms of
aberrant behavior." Shindell, The Public and the Criminal, 50 A.B.A.J. 545, 549 (1964).
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son for the continued existence of prejudicial publicity is just that
simple.6 The man in the street is not concerned with the problems
of ensuring a fair trial. Mr. Justice Douglas has remarked that, "A
man on trial for his life or liberty needs protection from the mob.
Mobs are not interested in the administration of justice. They have
basic appetites to satisfy."67 Reports of inadmissible evidence and
sensational commentaries cannot be justified by the "right of the
public to know." From an informative standpoint, the most balanced
picture which the press could convey of judicial proceedings would
come from a comprehensive summary after trial, not from the bits
and pieces from which the public must now try to glean anything
at all of value.68
The Contempt Power and the English Experience
As a matter of logic it would seem that the press could be cited for
contempt where published articles interfere with the empaneling of an
impartial jury. However, a consistent line of U.S. Supreme Court cases
has, as a practical matter, made contempt by publication a dead letter.
The power of state courts to punish news publications for contempt
is now restricted to those instances where the publication constitutes a
"clear and present danger" to the administration of justice. Starting in
1941 with Bridges v. California," and continuing in Pennekamp v.
Florida,70 and Craig v. Harney,71 the Supreme Court reversed holdings
in which state court judges had held the press in contempt of court.72
In elaborating on the "clear and present danger" test, the Supreme
Court said that the imposition of contempt is not justified if the pub-
lished matter has only a "reasonable tendency"73 to obstruct the legal
process and that to justify contempt the publication must make it "im-
possible in a very real sense for a court to carry on the administration of
66 "It is idle for such newspapers to claim that they adopt such practices in the
public interest. Their motive is the sordid one of increasing their profits, unmindful of
the result to the unfortunate wretch who may ultimately have to stand his trial for
murder." Justice Blair, Attorney General v. Tonks [19341 N.Z.L.R. 141, 150; quoted in
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 363 (1946); see Gilman, The Truth Behind the
News, 29 Amer. Mercury 139 (1933); See Daly, Ensuring Fair Trials and a Free Press,
50 A.B.A.J. 1037, 1038 (1964).67 Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840, 842 (1960).
68 Will, Free Press versus Fair Trial, 12 DEPAVL L. Bv. 197, 205'(1962); Contra,
N.Y. Daily News, May 6, 1954, p. 35 (editorial).
69 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
70 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
71331 U.S. 367 (1947).
72 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
73 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941).
[Vol. 17
justice." 4 However, it is most important to note that these cases did
not involve jury proceedings, but only pending cases which were being
heard by a judge.
But the Supreme Court's decisions cited above, and obvious political
pressures, seem to have effectively discouraged judges from using the
contempt power in jury cases which have been prejudiced by the
press.75 The Supreme Court has never faced the issue. The closest it
came was in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 78 where the Court
denied certiorari over Justice Frankfurter's vigorous dissent, expressed
in a twenty-page opinion. 7
The contempt power of the federal courts is even more limited.
Federal courts under Nye v. United States,78 and 18 U.S.C. 401 cannot
punish by contempt acts which occur outside the courtroom. 79
In England only the fact of arrest and certain matters occurring in
the pretrial stage can be published before the trial is concluded.80 If
this is violated, and the paper is convicted of contempt, then heavy
fine§ and jail sentences are imposed."' The English courts early recog-
74Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 370 (1946) (concurring opinion); Note,
Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 COLUm. L. EV. 349, 373
(1960).
75 Clarence Darrow commented that, "as the law stands today there is no im-
portant criminal case where the newspapers are not guilty of contempt day after day....
But nothing is done about it. No new laws are necessary. The court has full jurisdiction
to see that no one influences a verdict or decision. But everyone is afraid to act."
Quoted by Perry, Trial by Newspapers, 30 Mica. L. REv. 228, 234 (1931); see 66
U.S.L. REv. 374, 379 (1932); 11 PFIL. L.J. 277, 282 (1932); and in Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 363 (1946).
76 338 U.S. 912 (1949).
7 7 Defense counsel was forced to waive a jury trial because of prejudicial broad-
casts over a Baltimore station. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed a contempt
conviction, Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), and
the reversal was left standing by the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent was obviously intended to keep the door open for future determina-
tion of prejudice to a jury. No such cases have appeared to date. But the possibility
remains that the Supreme Court may uphold a contempt conviction for publicity which
prejudices a jury trial.
78 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
79 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 52 (1951), where Jackson, J., concurring,
remarked that the locality of the courtroom is "the last place where a well-calculated
obstruction of justice would be attempted." See Goss v. Illinois, 204 F. Supp. 268, 274
(N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963).80 Rex v. Clarke, [19103 103 L.T.R. (n.s.) 636, 640 (K.B.D. 1910); 30 HALSBURY,
LAws oF ENGLAND, 557; Will, supra note 68, at 205; Goodhart, Newspapers and Con-
tempt of Court in English Law, 48 HAsv. L. REv. 885 (1935).
s1 E.g., reporter and editor sentenced to six weeks imprisonment for publishing
material which would have been inadmissible in evidence, Rex v. Tibbits & Windust,
(1902) 1 K.B. 77; editor imprisoned for three months and 10,000 pound fine, The
Times (London), March 26, 1949, p. 4.
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nized the problem and utilized the existing contempt power to combat
it. 8 2
There is nothing to indicate that English readers have lost interest
in criminal trials and the workings of their courts because of the en-
forced delay of publication. In England, the strict use of contempt has
elevated press manners and decorum and consequently an accused has
an even chance of receiving a trial free from press interference.8
3
Voluntary Improvements by the Press and the Bar
For over thirty years the American Bar Association has attempted to
encourage the press to establish and live by its own codes of ethics.84 In
1923 the American Society of Newspaper Editors adopted seven
Canons of Journalism.8 5 However, those publishers most in need of
restraint are those least likely to undertake it voluntarily. In his usual
laconic style, H. L. Mencken said:
Journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine. . . . If American
journalism is to be purged of its present swinishness and brought up
to a decent level of repute-and God knows that such an improve-
ment is needed-it must be accomplished.., by external forces, and
through the medium of penalties, exteriorly inflicted."8
Very little change in either the quantity or quality of prejudicial
publicity can be noted since efforts at press and bar cooperation were
82 In Rex v. Fisher, 11 Rev. R. 799 (1811), Lord Ellenborough pointed out that
"If anything is more important than another in the administration of justice, it is that
jurymen should come to the trial ... with minds free and unprejudiced. It is possible
they should do so, after having read for weeks and months before ex parte statements
of the evidence against the accused... ?"
83 In a number of cases, Mr. Justice Frankfurter advocated the merits of the
English system and stated that "it will hardly be claimed that the press is less free
in England than in the United States." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 359 (1946).
See Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause C616bre, 36 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 810, 827 (1961). The English labor government has announced its intentions to
make press restrictions more rigid than ever, Time, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 71.
84 See Report of A.B.A. Special Committee on Cooperation between Press, Radio
and Bar, as to Publicity Interfering with Fair Trial of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial
Proceedings, 62 A.B.A. REP'. 861 (1937); Otterbourg, Fair Trial and Free Press, 39
A.B.A.J. 978, 979 (1953); Otterbourg, Fair Trial and Free Press: A New Look in 1954,
40 A.B.A.J. 838 (1954); Allen, Fair Trial and Free Press: No Fundamental Clash, 41
A.B.A.J. 897, 900 (1955); Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial
Jury, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 349, 372 (1960).
85 "Unfortunately, nothing further was done about these Canons officially," Otter-
bourg, Fair Trial and Free Press, 39 A.B.A.J. 978 (1953); The Warren Commission
said: "The promulgation of a code of professional conduct governing representatives of
all news media would be welcome evidence that the press had profited by the lesson
of Dallas.", WARREN REPoRT 242.
8 6 LeViness, Law and the Press, Baltimore Daily Record, March 11, 1932; Fenne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946).
[Vol. 17
FAIR TRIAL & PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
started thirty years ago. The Warren Report has brought about new
efforts at remedial action by the American Bar Association. There is no
indication yet as to the direction these new efforts and recommenda-
tions will take.87 Experience has shown that the realization of self-
restraint by news media is very unlikely.
The Prosecution as a Source of Prejudicial Publicity
For the press the prosecutor provides a source of highly dramatic
and readable news. For the prosecutor, the press provides a means of
publicizing his office and obtaining the public approval necessary to
the health of his political life.88 A close rapport usually exists between
the prosecuting attorney's office and newsmen on the crime beat.
In 1908 the American Bar Association adopted the Canons of
Professional Ethics, of which Canon 20, on "Newspaper Discussion
of Pending Litigation" provides that statements to newspapers by an
attorney as to pending or anticipated litigation are to be condemned.89
Generally, Canon 20 has been ignored as being too general 0
A few federal cases have developed a rule whereby if publicity
was in fact inspired by the prosecution, that in itself may be grounds
for a mistrial, regardless of the actual exposure of the jury to the
publicity."1 A wider application of such a rule may provide effective
judicial means of discouraging prosecutors from releasing such in-
formation.
8 7 The Warren Commission pointed out "the need for steps to bring about a
proper balance between the right of the public to be kept informed and the right of
the individual to a'fair and impartial trial," WAutEN REPOrT 242; an A.B.A. eleven-
man Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press has been named to implement
the recommendations of the Warren Commission, 9 A.B.A. News, No. 13, Dec. 15,
1964, p. 1; some local bar associations have acted similarly, e.g., see 14 San Francisco
B. A. Brief Case, No. 6, Nov., 1964, p. 5.88 Lofton, Justice and the Press, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 449, 458 (1961); POUND,
Canm AL JusTicE iN AMzcA 185 (1930); see Ross, Trial by Newspaper, Atlantic
Monthly, Sept., 1965, p. 63.
89 Canon 20 is effective in almost every state in the, form of a statute, court rule,
or state bar canon. Comment, 20 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 178, 181 (1963). As the repre-
sentative of the public, the prosecutor's words carry great weight with the people.
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinion 199, 26 A.B.A.J. 233 (1940).90 Voluntary compliance with the spirit of Canon 20 by prosecuting attorneys often
meets with the concerted opposition of the press. In 1954 New York District Attorney
Hogan announced that he had instructed his staff not to make public disclosure of
evidence or statements from suspects. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1954, p. 33. This touched
off a frenzy of severe journalistic criticism in which Hogan's statement was characterized
as "a grave blunder" and an example of "legalistic fascism." The Mirror, Feb. 12, 1954,
p. 5; See N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 12, 1954, p. 27; Wolfram, Free Press, Fair Trial & the
Responsibility of the Bar, 1 Cmn . L. 1Ev. (N.Y.) 3, 14 (1954).
91Henslee v. United States, 246 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1957); Delaney v. United
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In general, it would seem easier and perhaps politically wiser to
attempt to stem the flow of prejudicial publicity at its usual source-
the prosecution and police-than to undertake the unrewarding task
of imposing controls on the press itself.
Statutory Proposals
Proponents of statutory reform argue that voluntary compliance
with codes of ethics and procedural remedies are unrealistic and in-
adequate. "They have been before the bench, bar and press for over
thirty years, and still the practice continues." 2 These proponents go
on to suggest that legislative action would demonstrate to the press
that those responsible for the fair administration of criminal justice
are wholly disenchanted with the fatalistic notion that "trial by news-
paper' is "an unavoidable curse of metropolitan living."93
At an A.B.A. meeting in 1962 Justice Bernard S. Meyer of New
York suggested a form of uniform statute punishing the release or
publication of prejudicial material as a misdemeanor.9 4 Senator Wayne
Morse has introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate which would enable
the federal courts to cite for contempt an employee of the govern-
ment or defense counsel who divulges information not already made
public in court.9 5
In view of the past failure of other remedies, statutory proposals
seem to carry the most hope for any kind of meaningful reform.
CONCLUSION
n view of the inseparable three-way linkage of news media, law
enforcement agencies and the judiciary, improvement in the quality
of justice can hardly be realized without reforms on all sides.
States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952); Kutner, supra note 46, at 59; but see People v.
Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P.2d 330 (1952), aff'd, 343 U.S. 181 (1951).92 Comment, Trial by Newspaper, 33 FoRDEUM L. REv. 61, 76 (1964); Will, supra
note 68, at 216.
93 Will, supra note 68, at 216; see United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 865
(2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion).
94 The statute would define what facts are per se prejudicial and other items which
could also be prejudicial depending on the facts of the case. The statute would apply
to news media as well as defense attorneys, prosecutors and police. Address by Justice
Bernard S. Meyer, National Conference of State Trial Judges, A.B.A. meeting, Aug. 4,
1962; see Comment, supra note 92, at 75; Will, supra note 68, at 215; Comment, The
Case Against Trial by Newspaper, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217, 250 (1962).
95S.1802, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), introduced in 109 CoNG. REc. 11880
(1963), the bill died in committee but has been re-introduced in stronger form in the
current session of Congress as S. 1802, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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If the courts commence to disqualify as jurors all those who have
been exposed to inadmissible matter or sensationalized commentary
in the press, then the conduct of trials will be seriously impaired un-
less the press cuts down on the dissemination of such obviously
prejudicial material. The press cannot be expected to comply with
such a standard unless prosecutors and police take more seriously
their duty not to divulge information not yet put into evidence in
court. Even if external controls are imposed, they will depend for
their effectiveness on the cooperation of everyone involved. Most
importantly, the first step is that those concerned on all sides admit
that prejudicial publicity presents a serious defect in the present
administration of justice.

